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IGNORING THE HARM: THE SUPREME 
COURT, STIGMATIC INJURY, AND THE 
END OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
JOHN D. CASAIS* 
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should 
have achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown 
1.1 
But when does the transition end, and how will we know that point 
when we see it?2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the 1990s began, some eight hundred school systems in the 
United States were under court supervision3 because school authorities 
had operated them in a racially discriminatory manner.4 This supervi-
sion is the result of four decades of Supreme Court decisions recog-
nizing the stigmatic injury that segregated schools inflict on minority 
students5 and requiring school districts to remedy their segregated 
school systems.6 The goal of this supervision is the conversion of the 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,31 (1971). 
2 Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Carrective Ideal, 86 
COLUM. L. REv. 728, 789 (1986). 
3 David G. Savage, High Court Eases Busing Standards, LA. TiMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at AI. 
4 The distinction between de jure segregation, which results from intentional state action 
and is prohibited by the Constitution, and de facto segregation, which exists as a result of 
circumstance and is not, results from the Supreme Court's focus on whether the segregation was 
caused by the affirmative acts of the state. See Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,215 (1973) 
(Douglas,]., concurring); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (requiring racially 
discriminatory purpose); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (state-imposed segregation is condition to be 
corrected). The Supreme Court's initial cases concerned school districts where this distinction 
was not open to question because racial segregation had been required by law. See Green v. County 
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968) (segregation established by state constitution and statutes); 
Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954) (Brown l) (segregation established by state 
law). In Keyes, however, the Court held that such codification is not necessary. 413 U.S. at 201. 
Rather, the Court held that where school authorities have intentionally used their policies to 
isolate black children and maintain the one-race status of white schools, a constitutional violation 
is present. See id. at 199-201; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) 
(proof of "intentional state action" necessary element of school desegregation cause of action); 
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 & n.l (1976) (mem.) (finding of 
intentional segregative conduct by state necessary for desegregation). 
5 See Brown l, 347 U.S. at 494. 
6 See Green, 391 U.S. at 435-36. 
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illegally segregated, or "dual,"7 school systems into systems that are 
desegregated, or "unitary."8 
Mter decades of bitter debate about the effectiveness,9 correct-
ness, lO and methodologyll of desegregation, the discussion has shifted 
7 This term for a school system that is segregated by race is illustrated by the school system 
in Green, which comprised two subsystems, one "black" and one "white." See 391 U.S. at 432. 
8 A unitary school district is one in which the goal of removing all vestiges of prior uncon-
stitutional segregation from a school system has been achieved. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 13. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Board of Education v. Dowell, there is considerable disparity among the 
meanings given the term "unitary" by lower courts, stemming from the vagueness of the term. 
See 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991); see also OWEN M. FISS, TIIE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 14 (1978); 
J. Braxton Craven,Jr., Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-Brown Rides North, Maybe, 73 W. 
VA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1971) (noting "cryptic" meaning of unitary); T.A. Smedley, Developments in the 
Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1973) (standard for unitariness is 
unclear). But see Northcross v. Board ofEduc., 397 U.S. 232,236 (1970) (Burger, CJ., concurring) 
(rejecting suggestion that unitariness has not been defined). As a result, inconsistent definitions 
of the term have been used by the courts. Some courts have used the term to denote a school 
district that has completely remedied all discrimination, meeting the mandate of Brown I and 
Green. See United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987); Riddick v. School Bd., 
784 F.2d 524, 532-33 (4th Cir. 1986), cm. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 
758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985). Other courts have used the term with reference to school 
districts that have desegregated student assignments. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 
1503-04 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). Further, at least one court 
has drawn a distinction between "unitary school districts" that have not operated segregated 
schools for a period of several years and school systems with ''unitary status," which indicates a 
removal of all vestiges of past discrimination and an adjudication to that effect See Georgia State 
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985). The 
Supreme Court expressed doubts in Dowell concerning the utility of such precise definitions and 
subdefinitions, and refrained from doing so either in Dowel~ 498 U.S. at 245-46, or Freeman v. 
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443-44 (1992). However, the Supreme Court has stated that a unitary 
school system is one "within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because 
of race or color," Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19,20 (1969) (per curiam), 
and a "nonracial system" of schools in which discrimination has been completely removed. Green, 
391 U.S. at 436. For a more thorough discussion of unitariness, see infra part II.B. 
9 See, e.g., BOB BLAUNER, BLACK LIVES, WHITE LIVES 165 (1989) (some cities are as segregated 
with court-Qrdered desegregation as they would be with strict de jure segregation); JAMES C. 
COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 330 (1966) (racial composition of schools 
is unrelated to gains in black student achievement); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) (U.S. courts ineffective as producers of 
significant social reform); Derrick A. Bell, Learning From Our Losses: Is School Desegregation Still 
Feasible in the 1980s?, 64 PHI DELTA KApPAN 572, 575 (1983) (desegregation may fail to prevent 
psychological injuries that black school children suffered in segregated schools). 
10 See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 61-72 (criticizing desegrega-
tion); Drew S. Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE 
LJ. 1737, 1738 n.3 (1986) (reviewing PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE 
OF URBAN SEGREGATION (1985» (citing conflicting authorities); Nathaniel R. Jones, The Deseg-
regation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 515,553 (1984) (in favor 
of desegregation); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A R£ply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 31 (1959) (defending desegregation decisions); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32 (1959) (arguing that 
desegregation cases were decided incorrectly). 
11 See Derrick A. Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 124, 130-31 (Derrick A. Bell ed., 1980) (proposing 
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to the problem of when control of school districts should revert to local 
authorities and how district courts should abdicate their authority over 
school systems.12 The Supreme Court addressed these questions in 
Board of Education v. DowelTP and Freeman v. Pitts. 14 In Dowell, the Court 
ruled that a school district may be released from supervision when it 
shows that it has complied with court orders and is unlikely to revert 
to unconstitutional behavior. 15 In Freeman, the Court concluded that 
the supervising court may relinquish control of one part of a school 
system at a time, as each aspect of the system becomes unitary.16 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court largely ignored the stig-
matic injury that provided the basis for its initial determination that 
racial discrimination in the public schools violates the Fourteenth 
AmendmentY As a result, the Court has framed a doctrine for termi-
nating school desegregation that allows local authorities to regain 
control over all or part of a school district even if vestiges of prior 
discrimination that continue to cause stigmatic harm remain. So long 
as school authorities can demonstrate their recent compliance with the 
Constitution and court orders, their present good faith, and the elimi-
nation of most vestiges of prior intentional segregation, judicial super-
vision must cease. IS 
This Note analyzes when and how school desegregation should 
terminate, taking into account the stigmatic injury that the court 
ignores. A proper focus on stigmatic injury leads to the conclusion that 
greater efforts should be made to eliminate all vestiges of prior dis-
crimination from formerly segregated school systems. This emphasis 
alternatives to racial desegregation); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: 
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (1982) (discussion of use of 
"magnet" schools, redrawing district boundaries, consolidation of school systems, and busing); 
Owen M. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19 (1974) 
(arguing for "distributive conception" of remedy on grounds that desegregated schools are a 
normative right and de jure character is immaterial); Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 734 (arguing for 
corrective approach to remedy); Eileen M. Fava, Note, Desegregation and Parental Choice in Public 
Schooling: A Legal Analysis of Controlled Choice Student Assignment Plans, II B.C. THIRD WORLD 
LJ. 83, 89 (1991) (advocating use of "controlled choice" plans). 
12 See, e.g., Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and the 
Finding of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 519, 553 (1987); Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 789-91. 
13 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
14112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
15 498 U.S. at 247. 
16 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1444-45. These aspects are the six areas of schools that were 
identified as indicia of the presence or absence of a "dual" school system in Green v. County School 
Board: student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 
See id. (citing 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)). For a discussion of these areas, see infra notes 138-42 
and accompanying text. 
17 See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 261 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
18 See id. at 247. 
262 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:259 
on stigmatic injury also shows that comprehensive judicial control over 
a school district should continue until all aspects of school operations 
have been freed of such vestiges. 
Part II of this Note reviews the concept of stigmatic injury that led 
the Supreme Court to declare separate schools inherently unequal. 
Part III reviews the Supreme Court's decisions that developed the law 
of school desegregation as it pertains to the termination question, and 
examines the concept of unitariness that emerges from those prece-
dents. Part IV reviews the recent treatment of desegregation termina-
tion in the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Part V 
analyzes the Supreme Court's conclusions in Dowell and Freeman, and 
explains how they would be improved with a proper focus on stigmatic 
injury. 
II. SEGREGATION AND STIGMATIC INJURY 
[SJegregation s only purpose is to label or define blacks as inferior 
and thus exclude them from full and equal participation in soci-
ety.19 
The principle evil of school desegregation is that it stigmatizes the 
excluded race as inferior.2o Professor Kenneth B. Clark studied the 
stigmatizing effects of segregation as part of the Mid-Century White 
House Conference on Children and Youth in 1950.21 From that study, 
Clark concluded that black children strongly identifY themselves by 
race, that they have been taught that their race is inferior, and that this 
causes black children to reject their race and themselves.22 
Clark interviewed children aged three to seven to ascertain their 
attitudes about themselves and their race.23 Clark showed the children 
four dolls that were identical except that two were white and two were 
black.24 The interviewer asked the child which was the white or black 
doll, and which doll looked like them.25 The children answered the 
first question correctly, and responded to the second question depend-
19Charles Lawrence, "One Mare River to Cross"-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A 
Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 11, at 49,50. 
20 See Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 729 (injury suffered by blacks not segregation itself, but 
deliberate subordination by American society). 
21 See KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (1955). This book reprints the 1950 
study. The study was referenced by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educatilm, 347 U.S. 
483, 494 n.ll (1954) (Brown l). 
22 CLARK, supra note 21, at 19-24. 
23Id. at 19. 
24Id. 
25Id. 
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mg on their race.26 This demonstrated that the children showed a 
strong awareness of skin color and identified themselves by their race.27 
Clark then asked the children which doll the child would like to 
play with; which doll the child liked; and which doll looked nice, 
looked bad, or was a nice color.28 Black children showed an unmistak-
able preference for the white doll.29 Clark concluded that this evi-
denced self-rejection by the black children stemming from their aware-
ness and acceptance of prevailing racial attitudes.30 
Clark also found that segregated schools were one source of this 
message of inferiority.31 He stated that attending a white school evi-
dences the superiority of a white child, while a black child learns of 
his or her own inferiority by being placed in a black school,32 As Clark 
explained, "[a] child who is required to attend a segregated school is 
being taught that race is an important factor in his education. It is 
practically impossible for him to avoid including in his appraisal of 
himself ... the fact of his racial identity. "33 
A group of social scientists relied extensively on Clark's report in 
a later statement on school segregation.34 That report relayed Clark's 
conclusions and further developed his findings on the relationship 
between school segregation and self-rejection by black children.35 The 
report explained that enforced segregation is a major cause of such 
self-rejection.36 Segregation was found to cause self-rejection for three 
reasons: because it resulted from a decision by the majority group 
without the consent of the minority, because it was perceived in that 
way, and because segregation was historically based on the assumption 
of the excluded race's inferiorityYThe report concluded that enforced 
segregation compounds the problem, as it sanctions the assumptions 
of inferiority and the imposition of segregation on the minority race.38 
261d. at 19-22. 
271d. at 20-22. 
281d. at 23. 
291d. 
30ld. at 24; see also JOHN E. WILUAMS, RACE, COLOR AND THE YOUNG CHILD 191-92 (1976) 
(reaching similar conclusions from study in which black children preferred pictures of white 
children to those of black children); JUDITH PORTER, BLACK CHILD, WHITE CHILD: THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF RACIAL ATTITUDES 85--86 (1971). 
31 See CLARK, supra note 21, at 33. 
321d. 
331d. at 32-33. 
34 The report is reprinted in The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: 
A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REv. 427 (1955) [hereinafter The Effects of Segregation]. 
35 The Effects of Segregation, supra note 34, at 429-32. 
361d. at 432. 
371d. at 432-33. 
381d. at 433. 
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In 1965, Clark further explored the educational effects of this 
stigmatic injury and of segregation generally.39 As part of a larger study 
of the effects of segregation in Harlem, New York, Clark examined the 
effectiveness of overwhelmingly black inner-city schools.40 Clark found 
that the children in those schools lagged behind students elsewhere 
in New York City and throughout the nation in terms of IQ and 
academic achievementY This finding demonstrates that the stigmatic 
injury caused by segregation impairs the academic development of the 
affected students.42 
III. THE LAw OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
Clark's 1950 study and the social scientists' report based on his 
study were submitted to the Supreme Court for its consideration of the 
constitutionality of racial discrimination in public schools.43 As the 
following discussion shows, the stigmatic injury flowing from segrega-
tion had a significant effect on the development of the law of school 
desegregation. This Part begins with the Supreme Court's recognition 
of the unconstitutionality of desegregation, and briefly reviews the 
cases in which the Court developed its various desegregation doctrines. 
39 KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER (2d ed. 1989). 
40Id. at 117-25. 
41 Id. This finding was confirmed by a 1986 study of first-grade students in black, white, and 
integrated schools. Robert Dreeben & Adam Gamoran, Race, Instruction, & Learning, 51 AM. 
SOC. REv. 660, 661 (1986). That study found significant differences between learning by blacks 
and whites. Id. at 663. However, when other variables were held constant, it became apparent 
that the availability and use of superior resources in the white schools caused the disparity in 
learning ability. Id. at 667. 
42 CLARK, supra note 39, at 117-25. Studies showing that black students' achievement is 
improved by desegregation buttress the conclusion that this disparity is traceable to school 
segregation. See, e.g., Gail E. Thomas & Frank Brown, What Does Educational Research Tell Us 
About School Desegregation Effects?, 13 J. OF BLACK STUD. 155, 157-59 (1982) (reviewing studies 
showing improvement in black students' achievement after desegregation). A comprehensive 
review of studies on this issue was undertaken in 1982. See ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, 
DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT RAISE BLACK ACHIEVEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH (1982). 
Ninety-three studies measuring the impact of desegregation on minority achievement were 
analyzed to determine whether desegregation resulted in increases in achievement by desegre-
gated students. Id. at 7. Desegregation resulted in consistent IQ and achievement gains for black 
children, and gains in reading and language skills when reading aid was available at the transferee 
school. Id. at 24-25. The most impressive gains were made when desegregation was instituted in 
kindergarten and first grade, and where the transferee schools were predominantly, but not 
overwhelmingly, white. Id. at 35; see also ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, DESEGREGATION 
& BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 16 (1977) (concluding that desegregation has resulted and will continue 
to result in increased achievement by black children). 
43 CLARK, supra note 21, at vi; The Effects of Segregation, supra note 34, at 427. 
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This Part then examines in detail the concept of unitariness that 
evolved from those cases. 
A. School Desegregation in the Supreme Court 
The major Supreme Court precedents that provide the back-
ground for the issues decided in Board of Education v. DowelflA and 
Freeman v. Pitt15 can be placed into three groups. In the first group of 
cases, the Court recognized the stigmatic injury of segregation and 
held that segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.46 In the second group of cases, the Court announced the 
"affirmative duty" to desegregate, mandating the dismantling of for-
merly discriminatory school systems to remedy the stigmatic injury of 
segregation.47 Finally, the Court refined this affirmative duty to deseg-
regate in the third group of cases.48 These latter cases stated that the 
remedy a district court may impose on a segregated school system 
must be limited to school districts in which intentional segregation is 
shown,49 and prohibited courts from implementing remedies calling 
for the perpetual balancing of student assignments at particular lev-
els.50 
1. Recognizing Stigmatic Injury 
The Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence has its 
origins in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown J) ,51 perhaps the most 
important decision of the modern Supreme Court,52 and in its sister 
case of the same name (Brown II) .53 In Brown L the Court broke with 
the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,54 which had 
44498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
45 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
46 See Brown v. Board of Educ.. 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (Brown II); Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (Brown I); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
47 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. County 
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
48 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 71 7 (1974) (Milliken I). 
49 See Milliken 1,418 U.S. at 744-45. 
50 See Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 437-38. 
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown I the Court consolidated four school segregation cases: 
Brown v. Board of Education (Topeka, Kansas), Briggs v. Elliott (Clearendon County, South 
Carolina), Davis v. County School Board (Prince Edward County, Virginia), and Gebhart v. Belton 
(New Castle County, Delaware). Id. at 483 n.*. 
52 See Chandler, supra note 12, at 520 (quoting RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: 
THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3 (1984)). 
53 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
54 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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eroded over the past few decades.55 The Court held that separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal, and that maintaining 
such facilities constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws in 
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Supreme Court explicitly focused on the stigmatic injury 
inflicted upon black schoolchildren by segregation.57 The Court stated 
that segregation caused psychological damage and inculcated a sense 
of inadequacy in black children, "generat[ing] a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."58 
Brown II addressed the more difficult issue of how to remedy the 
stigmatic injury caused by segregation. 59 In that case, the Court con-
cluded that remedies for segregated schools would be determined by 
the district courts in which the particular cases had been brought, and 
that those courts should use equitable principles to formulate their 
remedies.60 The Court relied on the district courts because of their 
proximity to local conditions, which would enable them to ensure that 
school authorities carried out their remedial responsibilities in good 
faith. 61 Equitable principles were chosen for their "practical flexibility 
in shaping ... remedies and ... facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs."62 These needs included the public interest 
55 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1949) 
(black student, once admitted to state graduate school, must be provided with same treatment 
by state as students of other races); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.s. 628,635 (1949) (state must provide 
blacks with legal education equivalent to that offered to whites); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (state must provide blacks with facilities "substantially equal" to those 
afforded to whites). 
56Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I). The Court reached the 
same conclusion with respect to the effect of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 
holding unconstitutional de jure segregation in the District of Columbia schools. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
57 Brown 1, 347 U.s. at 494; see also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743--44 (1992) 
(O'Connor,]., concurring) (describing stigmatic effects of discrimination); Freeman v. Pitts, 112 
S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992) (noting that stigmatic injury is principal wrong of de jure segregation); 
cf Britton v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 812 n.20 (7th Cir. 1985) (no 
stigmatic implication of inferiority in preference against members of "dominant white majority 
group"), vacated on other grounds, 783 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE 556 (1976). 
58 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court buttressed this conclusion by citing Clark's study and 
several similar studies. Id. at 494 n.ll. 
59 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955). 
60 Id. at 299-301. 
61 Id. at 299. 
62Id. at 300; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 78 (1990) (Kennedy,]., concurring); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.s. 267, 288 (1977) (Milliken II); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
737-38 (1974) (Milliken I); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971); 
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in seeing an effective and systematic transition of school systems from 
dual to unitary,63 and the private need of minority children to attend 
schools without regard to their race.64 Brown II commanded a "prompt 
and reasonable start" toward compliance with Brown 1,65 and ordered 
courts to retain jurisdiction during the period of transition to racially 
nondiscriminatory school systems.66 Brown I and Brown II thus per-
formed two functions: they recognized the inequality implicit in inten-
tional segregation, and made it clear that the stigmatic injury to black 
children caused by such segregation is the harm to be remedied. 67 
2. The Mfirmative Duty to Desegregate 
Mter Brown II, the Supreme Court faced the task of determin-
ing what remedies sufficiently vindicated the rights of black school-
children. Initially, the Court considered a school district's obligations 
fulfilled upon admission of students to its schools without regard to 
race.68 This approach did not prevail. Instead, the Court recognized 
the need to eradicate the conditions that caused the stigmatic injury 
to continue.69 In Green v. County School Board,7° the Court held that 
school authorities who have operated intentionally segregated school 
systems in the past have an affirmative duty to desegregate their systems 
and remove all vestiges of prior discrimination. 71 This decision was 
followed by Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,72 where 
the Court authorized supervising district courts to order school boards 
Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141,1150 (6th Cir. 1992), eert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
2998 (1993); Gautreaux v. Chicago HollS. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 
284 (1976); Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 1970). 
63 Broom II, 349 U.S. at 300. 
64Id. at 298. 
65Id. 
66Id. at 301. 
67 Brown IL 349 U.S. at 301; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (Brown l). 
68 See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963) (transfer program allowing 
students to transfer from school where they were in the racial minority to one where they would 
be in the racial majority insufficient only because not accompanied by majority-to-minority 
transfer policy, which would allow pupils to choose their schools free of racial considerations); 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (duty discharged upon immediate general admission of 
black children to schools). This initial standard was summed up by the statement in Briggs v. 
Elliot that the Constitution "does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." 132 
F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). 
69 A trend toward a duty to integrate for school boards had originated with United States v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385, 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
7°391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
71 Id. at 435-36. 
72 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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that default on this affirmative duty to use radical measures to trans-
form their systems from dual to unitary.73 These cases clearly demon-
strate the need to remedy the continuing effects of prior unconstitu-
tional actions, rather than merely correcting the discriminatory actions 
of school boards, in order to end the stigmatic harms caused by school 
desegregation.74 
In Green, the Court rejected a school board's claim that its "free-
dom of choice" school attendance plan was a sufficient response to 
Brown Ips and held that Brown II imposed an affirmative duty on 
school boards to eradicate all vestiges of prior de jure segregation.76 
The New Kent County schools had been segregated by law prior to the 
Court's Brown I decision. 77 The school board eventually responded to 
Brown II by adopting its freedom of choice plan, under which pupils 
. either chose which school to attend at the beginning of each year or 
were assigned to the school they had attended the previous year.78 In 
rejecting this approach, the Green Court reasoned that while securing 
students' freedom to attend schools on a nondiscriminatory basis had 
been the immediate goal of Brown II, the ultimate aim was the transi-
tion of school districts to unitary, nonracial systems of public educa-
tion.79 The Court therefore recognized the affirmative duty of school 
boards to desegregate all aspects of school systems-student, faculty, 
and staff assignments, extracurricular activities, facilities, and transpor-
tation-to eliminate the racial identifiability of schools.80 Since the 
freedom of choice plan would not eliminate the vestiges of racial 
discrimination, the Court held it insufficient to discharge the school 
board's affirmative duty to desegregate.81 
73Id. at 18-30. 
74 See id. at 15; Green, 391 u.s. at 437-38. 
75 Under that plan, students would either choose which school to attend or be assigned to 
the school attended in the previous year. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34. The result was a pattern of 
separate white and black schools in which racial identifiability extended to all of the facets of 
school operations significant to the Court-student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, 
extracurricular activities, and facilities. Id. at 435. 
76Id. at 437-38; see Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 498-99 (1979) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,423 (1977) (Dayton l) (Brennan, 
J., concurring); Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,200 (1973); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15. See 
supra note 4 for a discussion of de jure desegregation. 
77 Green, 391 U.S. at 432. 
78Id. at 433-34. 
79Id. at 436. 
80 Id. at 435. 
81Id. at 438; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) 
(racially neutral remedies may fail to correct stigmatic harm). 
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In its opinion in Green, the Court also expressed frustration with 
the delay and evasion that had followed its demand for a prompt and 
reasonable start towards desegregation in Brown II82 The Court there-
fore instructed that school authorities be required to come forward 
with a plan that would work immediately.83 The Court ordered district 
courts to evaluate desegregation plans in practice, retaining jurisdic-
tion until state-imposed segregation had clearly been removed.84 
The affirmative duty to desegregate was affirmed in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,85 where the Court approved 
a district court's use of various radical measures to achieve unitar-
iness.86 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education had defaulted 
on its duty to dismantle its dual school system.87 The district court had 
responded by imposing a desegregation plan that relied on several 
unusual measures to desegregate the school district.88 That plan began 
with relatively innocuous steps such as the creation of a single athletic 
league and reassignment of teachers and administrative staff.89 How-
ever, the plan also radically redrew school attendance zones,90 used 
quotas for racial balancing,9] relied on extensive busing of students,92 
and ordered the closing of several schools.93 
The Supreme Court first examined the power of the supervising 
district courts in this context.94 The Court acknowledged that school 
authorities have the initial responsibility for compliance with Brown IL 
and that a finding of a constitutional violation is necessary before 
82 See Green, 391 U.S. at 438-39. 
83 Id. This urgency has been echoed in subsequent cases. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 
1436 (1992); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 280-81 n.15 (1977) (Milliken If); Swann, 402 U.S. at 13; Jenkins v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 
1009,1016 (8th Cir. 1992); Brown V. Board ofEduc., 892 F.2d 851, 866 (lOth Cir. 1989), vacated, 
112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992). 
84 Green, 391 U.S. at 439. 
85 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
86Id. at 9. 
87Id. at 7. 
88Id. at 8-10. 
89 [d. at 8. 
90Id. at 9. 
91Id. at 23-24. The district court had ordered that there be no imbalance greater than 71 % 
of one race to 29% of the other in the individual schools. Id. at 23. However, the court allowed 
for variations from this norm. [d. 
92Id. at 29-30. 
93Id. at 20-21. 
94Id. at 15. This aspect of the Court's decision was crucial, as it broke a "logjam" in lower 
courts over the scope of the remedial duty that had delayed meaningful relief in many commu-
nities. Days, supra note 10, at 1744 (quoting GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1980, at 4-5 (l983)). 
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district courts may impose a remedy.95 The Court stated, however, that 
where school authorities default on their affirmative duty to desegre-
gate, a district court may order the school system to take steps to meet 
that duty.96 
The Court applied this analysis to the racial quota set by the 
district court.97 While noting that a requirement of a certain racial 
balance as a substantive constitutional right would improperly impose 
a remedy beyond the constitutional violation, the Court approved of 
the district court's limited use of this ratio as a "starting point" in 
shaping a remedy.98 The Court also approved the extreme measures 
contained in the district court's order.99 It noted that remedies "may 
be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre ... and 
may impose burdens on some" but that dual school systems must be 
desegregated nonetheless. lOo Because the district court had concluded 
that the assignment of children to schools closest to their homes would 
not dismantle the dual school system, the order was within that court's 
authority. 101 
Green and Swann thus established a remedial standard completely 
consistent with the concept of stigmatic injury. Under those cases, a 
95 Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16. The Court recognized as a corollary to this that a remedy is 
limited to the scope of the constitutional violation. Id. at 16. 
96 Id.; see Columbus Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Anderson v. 
Dougherty County Bd. of Educ., 609 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1980) (ordering a district court to 
implement a plan where the school board had failed in its duty to desegregate). The Court also 
reasserted that courts should retain jurisdiction where necessary to ensure compliance. Swann, 
402 U.S. at 21. 
97 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 24-25. 
98Id. This has become axiomatic in the law of desegregation. See United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 194-95 (1987) (Stevens,]., concurring) (noting legitimacy of use of ratios as starting 
point in public employment discrimination case); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,788 n.l (1974) 
(Milliken 1) (Marshall,]., dissenting) (defending lower court's use of ratios by interpreting that 
use as a starting point); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235 
(1969) (approving target ratio); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No.1, 
839 F.2d 1296, 1305 (8th Cir.) (approving numerical ratio as starting point rather than rigid 
quota), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir.) 
("[r)acial quotas are to be used as a starting point ... but not as an ultimate goal .... "), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
99 Swann, 402 U.S. at 28. 
100 Id.; see Brown v. Board ofEduc., 892 F.2d 851, 867-68 (lOth Cir. 1989), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 
1657 (1992); Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1450 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); 
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 820 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1183 (1983); Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1042 (1977). 
IOI Swann, 402 U.S. at 30. Although the Court thus approved the radical rezoning used by 
the district court, it stated that there would be no need to make yearly adjustments to reflect 
demographic shifts once the affirmative duty to desegregate had been fulfilled. Id. at 31-32. 
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school system may not remedy prior segregation by mere reliance on 
neutral practices. 102 School authorities must instead take affirmative 
measures to eliminate all vestiges of segregation that would otherwise 
continue to inflict stigmatic harms, even if "bizarre" measures must be 
used. 103 
3. Limitations on Remedies 
Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions saw the Court retreat 
from this earlier aggressive stance, increasingly finding remedies to 
exceed the scope of the constitutional violation they addressed. In 
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1),104 the Court rejected a district court's 
remedy for segregation in the Detroit school system because the rem-
edy extended to adjacent school districts in which no intentional seg-
regation had been shown.105 In Pasadena City Board of Education v. 
Spangler,106 the Court struck down a racial quota because it was too 
strict and imposed requirements on the school district beyond the 
correction of the original constitutional violation.107 
In Milliken I, the Supreme Court held that a district court could 
not order a remedy comprising several school districts adjacent to the 
district where de jure segregation had been shown, or order a specific 
racial balance in every school, grade, and classroom in the involved 
districts. !Os Mter concluding that the segregation in the Detroit school 
system had resulted from intentional acts of state and local officials, 
the district court considered the viability of several remedial options. 109 
The court concluded that a remedy limited to the Detroit schools 
would not effectively dismantle the dual school system in accordance 
with the affirmative duty to desegregate. llo It therefore devised a rem-
edy reaching fifty-three outlying suburban school districts. III The court 
ordered measures be taken so that no school, grade, or classroom in 
those districts would have a racial composition differing from that of 
the extended desegregation area as a whole. 112 In rejecting this remedy, 
102 See id. at 28; Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968). 
103 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28; Green 391 U.S. at 436. 
104 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
105Id. at 744-45. 
106 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
107Id. at 434-35. 
108 418 U.S. at 740-4l. 
109Id. at 726-33. 
110Id. at 732-33. 
111 Id. at 733. 
112Id. at 739. 
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the Court first disposed of the strict racial composition requirement 
by invoking the command of Swann that particular degrees of racial 
balance may not be required as a matter of substantive constitutional 
right. 113 The Milliken I Court stated that the purpose of the remedy is 
not to provide such a balance, but to restore the victims of discrimina-
tory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence 
of that conduct. ll4 
The Court then rejected the multidistrict remedy, buttressing its 
conclusion that the remedy impermissibly exceeded the scope of the 
constitutional violation with observations concerning the extent of the 
federal equity power, the importance oflocal control over schools, and 
the competence of federal courts. In evaluating the extent of the 
federal equity power, the Court concluded that because the scope of 
the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitu-
tional violation,ll5 an interdistrict remedy depends on a showing that 
a constitutional violation in one district has been a substantial cause 
of interdistrict segregation. ll6 The Court justified this conclusion by 
citing the need to uphold the tradition of local control over schoolsll7 
and the need to avoid requiring a district court to act as de facto 
legislature and school superintendent-positions that were beyond its 
competence. llS Because de jure segregation had only been shown in 
the Detroit school district, the Court held that there was no basis for 
an in terdis trict remedy. 119 
113 Id. at 740. 
114Id. at 746; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (Milliken Il) (quoting 
Milliken L 418 U.S. at 746); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 1993) (remedy 
must restore victims to the position they would have occupied without discrimination) (citation 
omitted); United States V. Lawrence County Sch. Dist, 799 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Liddel V. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984). 
115 Milliken 1,418 U.S. at 744. This concept has been crucial in determining the limits of the 
power of federal courts in this context. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280; Dayton Bd. of Educ. V. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton /); Hills V. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976). 
116 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744--45. 
117 See id. at 741-42. Such control has been consistently recognized as a consideration to be 
taken into account by a court framing a remedy for discrimination. See Board of Educ. V. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,49 (1973) (citing 
Wright V. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting»; Flax v. Potts, 
864 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir. 1989); Spangler V. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 
n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
118 See Milliken L 418 U.S. at 743-44. 
119Id. at 744-45. The Court's ruling was qualified by the facts that no finding was made of 
cross-district violation and that no meaningful opportunity was given for the outlying districts to 
be heard. Id. at 721-22. A later case further undermined the limits placed on interdistrict 
remedies by Milliken L stating that interdistrict remedies are permissible so long as they do not 
infringe on the autonomy of outlying school districts. See Hills, 425 U.S. at 305-06. Therefore, it 
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Milliken I was followed by Pasadena City Board of Education v. 
Spangler, 120 where the Court again found that a lower court's remedial 
reach exceeded its constitutional grasp. In Pasadena City, the Court 
rejected a district court's order that contemplated a perpetual balanc-
ing of student assignments at a specified level.l2l Mter finding that a 
dual school system existed, the district court had mandated that stu-
dent assignments be readjusted yearly so that minority students would 
never form the majority of the student body of any school. I22 Although 
the plan balanced student assignments in the year after it was imple-
mented, the district court refused the school board's subsequent re-
quest to dissolve the racial quota.123 
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court rejected 
this approach.124 The Court first rejected the rigid racial quota under 
the rule of Swann.125 Swann was then cited for the rule that school 
desegregation remedies are limited to the extent of the constitutional 
violation. 126 Because the district court's order had remedied the con-
stitutional violation by balancing student assignments, the district court 
did not have the power to require annual readjustment of school 
attendance zones to maintain its quota. 127 The Court thus concluded 
that the district court's inflexible remedy exceeded constitutionallimits.128 
The cases from Brown I to Pasadena City establish the duty to 
eradicate vestiges of prior de jure segregation that cause stigmatic 
injury to black students.129 Milliken I and Pasadena City establish im-
portant limits on how a court may remedy that i~ury.130 Also impor-
tant, but vague, is the Court's concept of unitariness. The cases from 
Green on deal with the concept of unitariness as a goal of, and a limit 
upon, supervising district courts. 131 The Court has failed to fully ex-
appears that Milliken I did not ban interdistrict remedies so much as it banned certain intrusive 
types of inter district remedies. Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 779. 
120 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
121Id. at 440. 
122Id. at 428, 433. 
123Id. at 434-36. 
124Id. at 440. 
125 Id. at 434. 
126Id. 
127Id. 
128Id. at 435. 
129 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971); Green v. 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968). 
130 See Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 436-37; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) 
(Milliken l). 
131 See Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 436-37; Milliken L 418 U.S. at 744-45; Swann, 402 U.S. at 
15; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. 
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plain this concept, however, and this omission has generated consid-
erable confusion. 
B. Unitariness-The "Central Riddle"132 
The goal of Brown Irs remedial effort, as stated in Green, is the 
transformation of school systems from dual to unitary.133 The Supreme 
Court has indicated the meaning ofunitariness with broad and impre-
cise statements. It has said that a unitary school system is a "nonracial 
system" of schools where segregation has been eliminated "root and 
branch. "134 Unitariness has also been held to result from the elimina-
tion of all vestiges of de jure discrimination throughout the system.135 
On other occasions, the Court called for the elimination of racial 
identifiability of schools, so that there are not white or black schools, 
but '~ust schools."136 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given no 
real content to that term, and lower courts have struggled with its 
meaning.137 
1. Measuring Unitariness 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that lower courts must 
measure the unitariness of a school district by examining all aspects 
of the school system's operations-student assignments, faculty, staff, 
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 138 These aspects 
132 Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegre-
gation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697,697 (1971). 
133 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown Il). 
134 Green, 391 U.S. at 436, 438; see also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 
19, 20 (1969) (per curiam). 
135 See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) ("clear command" of Brown 
II was "to eliminate every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the schools"); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) (Milliken II); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 
U.S. 406, 423 (1977) (Dayton I) (Brennan,]., concurring); Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 
189,200 (1973); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972). 
136 Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42; see Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 262 (1991) (Marshall, 
]., dissenting) ("'the goal is a system without white schools or Negro schools"') (quoting Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802-D3 (1974) (Milliken I); Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20; Raney v. Board 
of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 448 (1968). 
137 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 895 F.2d 659, 665 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1082 (1991) ("the Supreme Court has not defined precisely what facts or factors make a 
district unitary"); Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 883 F.2d 945, 950 n.2 
(1Ith Cir. 1989) (noting "confusion in the lower courts surrounding the definition of 'unitary'''). 
Unitariness has been defined inconsistently even within the same circuit. Compare Pitts v. Free-
man, 887 F.2d 1438, 1445 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) with Georgia State 
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985). 
138 Green, 391 U.S. at 435. 
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provide courts with indicia of whether the school system has achieved 
unitariness as a whole.139 It has long been recognized that these factors 
are interrelated,140 and thus that the supervising court has a duty to 
remedyI41 all aspects of a school system.142 
The Supreme Court has developed three presumptions to aid 
district courts in measuring the unitariness of a school district. These 
presumptions are crucial because of the complexity of the questions 
139 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 u.s. 1, 18 (1971); see also Freeman v. 
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992) (factors provide a measure of racial identifiability of a school 
system). 
140 See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 742 F. Supp. 1275, 1291 (D. Md. 1990) (the Green factors 
are interdependent upon each other), afl'd sub 1Wm. Stone v. Prince George's County Bd. of 
Educ., 977 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 973 (1993); see also Dayton Bd. of 
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 (1979) (Dayton If) (noting that faculty assignment segre-
gation is inextricably tied to segregation in student assignments). This corresponds accurately 
with sociologists' conception of schools as complete social systems in which these factors con-
stantly interact. Brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae at 
12-13, Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (No. 89-1290) (schools are "'dynamic social systems 
made up of interrelated factors'") (citing S. Purkey & M. Smith, Effective Sclwols-A Review, 83(4) 
ELEMENTARY SCH.]' 440 (1983). 
141 See, e.g., Milliken L 418 U.S. at 744 ("federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate 
remedies" upon breach of students' constitutional rights); Davis v. School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 
37 (1971) (upon showing of violation, court or local authorities must "make every effort" to 
implement a unitary school system); Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 
380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch., 778 F.2d 404, 433 
(8th Cir. 1985) (showing of violation gives district court duty to implement effective remedy), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978). 
142 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977) (Milliken If) (basic task is achieving 
public school system free of discrimination) (quoting United States v. Montgomery County Bd. 
of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1969); Milliken L 418 U.S. at 737 (aim of Br(JlJ)n Iwas elimination 
of de jure school systems); Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,225-26 (1973) (Powell,]., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (right at issue is that of expecting that school board 
will operate nondiscriminatory school systems) ; Swann, 402 U.S. at 22 (" [t] he remedy commanded 
[in Brown 1] was to dismantle dual school systems") (emphasis added); Green, 391 U.S. at 435 
(flaw of desegregation plan affecting only student assignments was its failure to remedy all aspects 
of a school system). This insistence upon remedies in all aspects of a school system coincides with 
the conclusions of many studies that have found that a sim ultaneous attack on all parts of a school 
system is necessary for the effective eradication of prior de jure segregation. See Brief of the 
NAACP et al. as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.27, Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (No. 89-1290) 
(citing R. Scott & J. McPartland, Desegregation as National Policy: Correlates of Racial Attitudes, 19 
AM. EDUC. REs. J. 397-414 (1984); W.D. Hawley, Equity and Quality in Education: Characteristics 
of Effective Desegregated Sclwols, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 298-99 (W.D. Hawley ed., 
1981); Sheehan, A Study of Attitude Changes in Desegregated Intermediate Schools, 53 Soc. OF EDUC. 
51-59 (1980); LARRY W. HUGHES ET AL., DESEGREGATING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1980); G. FORE-
HAND & M. RAGOSTA, A HANDBOOK FOR INTEGRATED SCHOOUNG 11-12 (1976)). This is because 
continuing vestiges of discrimination inflict stigmatic harms and result in an inferior education 
to the same extent as does present de jure segregation. Id. at 19 & n.23 (citing WEINBERG, 
MINORITY STUDENTS: A RESEARCH ApPRAISAL 159 (1977); Edgar]. Epps, The Impact of Sclwol 
Desegregation on the Self-Evaluation and Achievement Orientation of Minority Children, 42 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1978)). 
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of causation and intent involved in determining whether segregation 
has been caused by intentional actions of the school board or other 
factors. 143 Because of this complexity, these presumptions have a ten-
dency to preordain rulings against school authorities. 144 
First is the presumption against one-race schools identified in 
Swann. 145 According to this presumption, school systems containing 
individual schools whose students are practically all of one race have 
the burden of demonstrating that this segregation is not the result of 
intentional action by school authorities.146 
The second presumption operating against school authorities is 
known as the Keyes presumption, after the case that created it. Keyes v. 
School District No. ]147 involved a school district where a significant 
amount of segregation had been shown to have resulted from inten-
tional state action. 148 The Supreme Court created a presumption to aid 
the plaintiffs in that case: all segregation in a school district shown to 
be partially de jure segregated is presumed to result from intentional 
actions of school authorities.149 The effect of this presumption is to 
allow the supervising court to impose a systemwide remedy on the 
143 See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, j., concurring). 
144 See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727,2748 (1992) (Scalia,j., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting the "ordinarily unsustainable burden of proving the negative 
proposition that [the school board] is not responsible for extant racial disparity"); Robert Belton, 
Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural justice, 34 
VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1206 (1981); Chandler, supra note 12, at 545 ("Allocation of the burden of 
proof is often dispositive of the merits of the claim."). 
145 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 26. 
146 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1457 n.l (Blackmun,j., concurring) ("there is a presumption in a 
former de jure segregated school district that the board's actions caused the racially identifiable 
schools"); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 527, 537 (1979) (Dayton II); Columbus Bd. 
of Educ. v. Penick, 433 U.S. 449, 460 (1979); Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741 n.19; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 
208; Swann, 402 U.S. at 26. 
147 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
148 Id. at 192. 
149 Id. at 208. The Keyes Court noted that its presumptions were justified by probability, policy, 
and fairness. Id. at 207-09. As Professor Gewirtz has stated, the "antecedent probability" that 
school authorities who have operated a dual system in substantial part have also maintained the 
rest of the system in a like manner is high, justifying the presumptions on probability grounds. 
Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 786. He further points out that school authorities are more likely to 
have information about their motives and the effect of their actions. Id. at 786--87. This supports 
the fairness justification of the presumption. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding 
of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653,659 (1987). Finally, the 
policy justification for this presumption lies in the fact that the defendant school board has been 
proven to be a wrongdoer with respect to a substantial part of the school system; thus, "it is 
preferable for errors of factfinding to be made in plaintiffs favor once the plaintiff has shown 
that the defendant purposefully segregated in at least a substantial part of the school system." 
Gewirtz, supra note 2, at 786--87. Similar justifications motivate the other presumptions in this 
context. See Note, supra, at 658. 
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school district when only part of the school system has been shown to 
be in ten tionally segregated.150 
The Court momentarily abandoned the Keyes presumption in Day-
ton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton l) .151 In that case, a district 
court had found that three discrete violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause constituted a "cumulative violation" that justified a systemwide 
desegregation remedy.152 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
the remedy was broader than the constitutional violation required. 153 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion introduced the concept of "incremental 
segregative effect," and instructed district courts to tailor remedies to 
redress only segregation that had been caused by unconstitutional 
actions. 154 The Court ordered lower courts to examine the segregation 
in the schools, determine how much would have occurred without 
intentionally discriminatory actions by the school board, and fashion 
a remedy that would correct segregation beyond that amount.155 
This was corrected by the Court's decision when the Dayton case 
returned after remand. 156 Dayton II created the final presumption op-
erating against school authorities.157 Dayton II permitted plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case without having to prove that currently 
racial identifiable schools were caused by past intentionally discrimina-
tory acts.15S Instead, causation was presumed when such effects fol-
lowed past de jure segregation.159 The Court thus considerably eased 
plaintiffs' burden in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 160 
2. The Mfirmative Duty to Desegregate 
While the riddle of unitariness has yet to be solved, one thing is 
clear about the status of a school board prior to a finding that uni-
tariness has been achieved. Once the school board has defaulted in its 
150 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208 (burden also shifts with regard to proof that "other segregated 
schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions"). 
151 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
152ld. at 413. 
153Id. at 417. 
154Id. at 420. 
155 Id.; see also Days, supra note 10, at 1749. 
156 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton If). 
157Id. at 537. 
158 See G. Scott Williams, Note, Unitary School Systems and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed 
Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 794,814 (1987) ("If plaintiffs show a systemwide violation followed 
by segregation in the schools at some point after the violation, [Dayton IlJ presumes the causal 
connection.") . 
159 Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 537; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979). 
160 See Days, supra note 10, at 1750. 
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constitutional duties, it is subject to the affirmative duty to desegregate 
imposed by Green. 161 Steps must be taken to desegregate the school 
system and remove all vestiges of prior de jure segregation that will 
otherwise continue to inflict the stigmatic injury identified by Broum 
1 162 The adoption of racially neutral practices by school authorities 
is insufficient to bring the school system into constitutional compli-
ance. 163 Rather, those authorities must make every effort to achieve 
unitariness, and bear the burden of showing that the choice of less 
effective measures over more effective alternatives is not driven by 
illicit motives.164 Moreover, if school authorities take actions that per-
petuate or reestablish segregation prior to unitariness, they must show 
that those actions serve "important and legitimate" purposes. 165 
The affirmative duty to desegregate also includes countering any 
demographic shifts caused by lingering vestiges of past desegrega-
tion. l66 Because people tend to consider the racial composition of area 
schools when deciding where to live, outstanding vestiges of prior de 
161 391 u.s. at 437-38; see Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 459; McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 
U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 978 F.2d 1574, 1583 
(11th Cir. 1992); Lee v. Macon County Bd. ofEduc., 616 F.2d 805,810 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirmative 
duty remains where school system has not been made unitary); supra notes 70-84 and accompa-
nying text. 
162 Green, 391 U.S. at 435-36. 
163 See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1992) (where effects of de jure 
segregation linger, affirmative duty is not discharged by adoption of racially neutral policies); 
Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,212 (1973) (racially neutral plans that fuil to counteract 
prior discrimination not sufficient to discharge affirmative duty) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,28 (1971»; Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 
1991) (that policy may be racially neutral does not prove that the effects of prior discrimination 
have been eliminated), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1664 (1992); see also Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 538 
("[T]he measure of ... a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system is 
the effectiveness, not the purpose, of [the school board's] actions .... ") (citing Wright v. Council 
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) and Davis v. School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971». 
164 Fardice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2744 (1992) (O'Connor,]., concurring) (where less segregative 
means exist to accomplish educational purpose, a "heavy burden [is] upon the [state] to explain 
its preference") (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 439); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 266 
n.10 (1991) (Marshall,]., dissenting) (same); Arvisu v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 F.2d 499, 504 
(5th Cir. 1974); Haneyv. City Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364, 370 (8th Cir. 1970). 
165 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1458 (1992) (Blackmun,]., concurring); Dayton II, 443 
U.S. at 538; Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 895 F.2d 659, 667 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1082 (1991); F1ax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989). 
166 See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985) (demographic shifts 
before unitariness must be countered); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 
1435 (5th Cir. 1983) (duty to desegregate includes responsibility to adjust to demographic shifts 
to the fullest extent possible) (citing Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 810 (5th 
Cir. 1980»; United States v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 37, 38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1007 
(1978). 
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jure segregation have an inevitable effect on area housing choices.167 
Courts have held that until those vestiges are eliminated, demographic 
shifts do not excuse school authorities from their affirmative duty to 
desegregate. 168 
The effect of a finding of unitariness was uncertain prior to Board 
of Education v. Dowell and Freeman v. Pitts. The only certainty was that 
such a finding returns control of a school system to local school au-
thorities.169 The questions of exactly what constitutes unitariness, how 
such control should be ceded to elected authorities,170 and what effect 
a finding of unitariness has on the burden of proof and presumptions 
against school authoritiesl7! remain unsettled before those cases, as 
contrasting conclusions were reached in the various circuits. 
167 See Keyes, 413 u.s. at 202 (racially identifiable schools have a "reciprocal effect on the 
racial composition of residential neighborhoods ... causing further racial concentration within 
the schools"); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.l3 (1979) (noting 
that residential segregation is responsibility of school authorities if it is shown to be a substantial 
cause of school segregation); United States v. Board ofSch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 
1978) ("racial segregation in public schools and racial segregation in housing are integrally 
interrelated") . 
168 See Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 988; Davis, 721 F.2d at 1435. 
169 See United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 117l, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (after attaining unitary 
status, a school board may act as it pleases so long as it does not purposefully discriminate); 
Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 988 (same); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 
1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 
808 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Chandler, supra note 12, at 539; Donald E. Lively, Separate But Equal: 
The Low Road Reronsidered, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 55 n.78 (1986). 
170 Compare Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that incremental 
withdrawal is permissible) and United States v. Lawrence County Sch. Dist, 799 F.2d 1031, 1059 
(5th Cir. 1986) (Higgenbotham,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating return 
of judicial control incrementally) with Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438,1446 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[a] 
school system achieves unitary status or it does not"), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) and Riddick 
v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.) (all aspects of a school system's operations must be 
free of vestiges of intentional segregation before control of the school system is returned to state 
authorities), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
171 Compare Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1492 (lOth Cir. 1989) (placing burden 
of proof on school authorities despite finding of unitariness), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) and 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 862 (10th Cir. 1989) (burden of proof remains with 
defendants after finding of unitariness), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992) with Overton, 834 F.2d 
at 1175-76 (finding of unitariness releases district from burden of proof with regard to intent) 
and School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987) (presumptions and placement of 
burden of proof on defendants cease with finding of unitariness) and Riddick, 784 F.2d at 536-37 
(unitariness places burden of proof on plaintiffs). But see Morgan, 831 F.2d at 326 n.19 (noting, 
without deciding, that plaintiffs may have benefit of modified burden of proof even after finding 
of unitariness). See also Note, supra note 149, at 668-69 (proposing modified burden of proof). 
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IV. TERMINATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
This Part examines the major appellate and Supreme Court deci-
sions addressing the meaning of unitariness and its effects. Riddick v. 
School BoartJl72 and Dowell v. Board of EducationI73 reached different 
conclusions in defining when a school district becomes unitary. Con-
currently, Morgan v. Nuccil74 and Pitts v. FreemanI75 addressed the ques-
tion of whether a district court may withdraw its .supervision over 
unitary parts of a school system that has not yet achieved complete 
unitariness. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two of these 
cases, and resolved these issues in Board of Education v. Dowelp76 and 
Freeman v. Pitts. 177 
A. Termination of Desegregation in the Courts of Appeals 
In 1986 the Fourth Circuit expressed its opinion on the definition 
and effect of unitariness in Riddick v. School Board. I78 In Riddick, that 
court held that judicial supervision of a formerly de jure segregated 
school system ends when vestiges of intentional racial segregation have 
been removed from all aspects of that system contemporaneously.I79 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a drastically 
different conclusion in Dowell v. Board of Education. I80 The Dowell court 
held that an injunctive decree ordering a school system to become and 
remain unitary outlasts a finding that vestiges of segregation have been 
eliminated and may be dissolved only upon a showing of an extreme 
change in circumstances. I81 In Morgan v. Nucci,I82 the First Circuit held 
that when a school system becomes unitary in one aspect of its opera-
tions, the supervising court must relinquish control over that aspect 
while retaining jurisdiction over the system to ensure that overall 
unitariness is achieved. I83 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit decided in 
Pitts v. FreemanI84 that a supervising district court in the same circum-
172 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
173890 F.2d 1483 (lOth Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
174 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987). 
175887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
176 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
177112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
178 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 938 (1986). 
1'19 Id. at 533-35. 
180 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
181Id. at 1490-91. 
182 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987). 
183 Id. at 319. 
184 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (l992). 
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stances must continue to take actions over all aspects of a school system 
until the entire system has been unitary for several years.185 This section 
will now discuss these four cases, which demonstrate the diverging 
paths taken by the federal appellate courts. 
1. Riddick v. School Board 
The subject of Riddick v. School Board was the Norfolk, Virginia 
school system, which had been segregated by law prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Brown [186 Mter lengthy litigation, the Norfolk 
school system was found to be unitary in 1975.187 The school board 
continued the crosstown busing that the district court had mandated 
before that finding. 188 In 1983, the board attempted to counter increas-
ing ''white flight" from its schools by adopting a geographic pupil 
reassignment plan for its elementary schools. 189 
The Riddick action ensued, as the plaintiffs attempted to prevent 
implementation of the pupil reassignment plan. The district court held 
the reassignment plan to be constitutional, concluding that the 1975 
finding of unitariness had been correct. 190 The court also concluded 
that the finding of unitariness shifted the burden of proof regarding 
discriminatory intent from the school board to the plaintiffs, and that 
the plaintiffs had not met that burden.191 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusions.192 The 
appellate panel held that a finding of unitariness is predicated on a 
showing that all aspects of the school system have been freed from the 
vestiges of de jure segregation, measured by the indicia of Green v. 
County School Board. 193 Furthermore, it held that the finding of uni-
tariness both ends the supervising district court's role and returns the 
burden of proof of discriminatory intent to the plaintiffs.194 
The court of appeals reached this conclusion because of the im-
portance of local control over schools and the limited power of the 
federal courts.195 The court reasoned that because the use of the fed-
1851d. at 1446. 
186 Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir.) , cert. denied, 479 u.S. 938 (1986). 
1871d. at 525. 
1881d. 
1891d. 
1901d. at 528. 
1911d. 
1921d. at 544. 
1931d. at 533 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)). 
1941d. at 534-35. 
1951d. at 538-39. 
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eral equity power in this context depends on a continuing constitu-
tional violation, the court's involvement must end upon the finding of 
unitariness.196 Because such a finding signals the end of the violation, 
if a court does not then cease its involvement with the school district, 
it will be imposing the perpetual racial balancing condemned in 
Pasadena City.197 
2. Dowell v. Board of Education 
In Dowell v. Board of Education, 198 the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit addressed a factual situation similar to that faced by the 
Fourth Circuit in Riddick. The Dowell litigation began in 1961 and 
resulted in a 1972 order commanding that the school system be made 
unitary.199 The court adopted a desegregation plan proposed by the 
plaintiffs and ordered the school board not to deviate from the plan 
without the court's permission.20o Mter a finding of unitariness in 
1977,201 the school district continued to comply with the original order 
until 1984.202 It then adopted a Student Reassignment Plan (SRP) that 
contemplated the reemergence of several one-race schools.203 
Mter the district court found the SRP constitutional and refused 
to reopen the case, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a 
finding of whether the initial injunction had been violated and 
whether that injunction should be dissolved or modified.204 The appel-
late court did not consider the underlying constitutional issues, but 
treated the case as involving only the issue of the dissolution of injunc-
tions.205 The district court found that the school board was not respon-
sible for the demographic changes that had made the original deseg-
regation plan inequitable, that nondiscriminatory reasons motivated 
the adoption of the SRP, and that the school district continued to be 
unitary.206 Therefore, the district court concluded that modification of 
196 Id. 
197Id. (quoting Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 u.S. 424, 433-34 (1976». 
19S890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
199 Id. at 1491. 
200 Id. (quoting Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1272 (W.O. Okla.), afrd, 465 
F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972». 
201 See Dowell v. School Bd., No. CIV-9452, slip op. (W.O. Okla. Jan. 18, 1977). 
202 Dowel~ 890 F.2d at 1486. 
203Id. at 1487. 
204!d. (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir.) , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
938 (1986). 
205 Dowel~ 795 F.2d at 1523. 
206 See Dowel~ 890 F.2d at 1488-89 (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1518 
(W.O. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (lOth Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991». 
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the 1972 decree was unnecessary and that the school board was free 
to adopt the SRP.207 
The plaintiffs appealed once again to the Tenth Circuit. 208 The 
court of appeals again focused its analysis on questions of dissolution 
of injunctions independent of the underlying constitutional issues. 209 
The court stated that while the school system regulated by the injunc-
tion had been declared unitary, the injunction could not be dissolved 
upon a finding of mere compliance.210 Instead, it held that the school 
board must satisfY the test of United States v. Swift & Co.211 by showing 
an extreme hardship caused by new and unforeseen conditions.212 
Because the school board's actions violated the injunction, which had 
not been dissolved before the SRP was adopted, the court placed the 
burden on the school board to either show that it had met its continu-
ing affirmative duty to accomplish desegregation, or demonstrate that 
circumstances had changed so that the injunction should be dis-
solved.213 The court found that the one-race schools allowed plaintiffs 
to establish a prima facie case that the district was no longer unitary.214 
It also found that the school board's claims of hardship were based on 
conjecture and that the demographic changes were foreseen at the 
time the decree was framed.215 
Although this finding led the Court of Appeals to conclude that 
the decree should not have been dissolved, it found that the changed 
circumstances provided a reason to modifY the decree. 216 The court 
ignored the previous finding of unitariness and ordered that the de-
cree be modified in light of the continuing duty to desegregate man-
dated by Swann.2J7 The court found that feasible measures to desegre-
gate remained open to the school board and ordered that the decree 
be modified to include those measures. 218 
3. Morgan v. Nucci 
While the issue of when a school system may revert to local control 
was being argued in the above cases, the question of how supervising 
207 [d. at 1488-89 (citing Dowell, 677 F.2d at 1512-18). 
208 [d. at 1489. 
209 [d. at 1490-9l. 
210 [d. at 1489-92. 
211286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
212 Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490. 
213 [d. at 1492-93. 
214 [d. 
215 [d. at 1493, 1498. 
216 [d. at 1499. 
217 [d. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971)). 
218 [d. at 1505. 
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courts should relinquish control was considered in Morgan v. NUCct'219 
and Pitts v. Freeman. 22o In Morgan, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that a district court supervising the Boston school district 
was obligated to refrain from adjusting student assignments once that 
aspect of the school district had become unitary.221 In Pitts, the Elev-
enth Circuit reached the opposite result, concluding that the affirma-
tive duty to desegregate applies to every aspect of a school system until 
the entire system has been unitary for a period of several years.222 
The Morgan litigation began in 1972 and resulted in a 1974 ruling 
that the Boston schools had been intentionally segregated.223 The fed-
eral district court for the District of Massachusetts subsequently issued 
several orders to make all aspects of the schools' operations unitary. 224 
In 1982, the district court determined that the Boston schools had 
made significant progress toward unitariness and began to turn direct 
supervision of the district over to the Massachusetts Board of Educa-
tion.225 In 1985, the district court dissolved half of its original orders 
and issued several final orders that enunciated binding require-
ments.226 Among these requirements was an order mandating that the 
school district maintain student assignments at the ratio that they had 
been required to achieve by the original orders.227 
The Boston School Committee appealed. 228 It claimed that the 
school district had achieved substantial compliance with the district 
court's original student assignment order.229 The school board asserted 
that the further final order impermissibly dictated a particular degree 
of racial balance despite the fact that student assignments had become 
uni tary. 230 
The First Circuit agreed with the school committee.231 It remanded 
the case to the district court to determine whether student assignments 
in the Boston schools had become unitary, and to relinquish control 
219 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987). 
220 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); see also United States v. 
Overton, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987). 
221 831 F.2d at 319. 
222887 F.2d at 1446-48. 
223 Morgan, 831 F.2d at 315. 
224Id. at 316. 
225Id. 
226Id. 
227Id. at 316-17 & n.3. 
228Id. at 317. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 317-18. 
231 Id. at 326. 
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over that aspect of the school system if they had.232 The appellate court 
construed Pasadena City Board oj Education v. Spangler33 to require a 
court that finds one area of a school system unitary to relinquish 
control over that area to local authorities. 234 The court read Pasadena 
City to hold that when a school district has achieved unitariness in 
student assignments, the supervising court has fully remedied the 
previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.235 The court 
therefore held that proper respect for local control mandates that 
judicial involvement with an aspect of a school district must cease when 
that aspect becomes unitary.236 Although the court's examination of 
the record led it to believe that student assignments were unitary, it 
remanded the case to the district court to evaluate the number of 
one-race or racially identifiable schools, the good faith of the school 
authorities, and the achievement of maximum practicable desegrega-
tion in student assignments.237 
4. Pitts v. Freeman 
In Pitts v. Freeman, the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to 
follow the First Circuit's reasoning.238 Instead, it held that a school 
board must continue to meet its affirmative duty to desegregate until 
all aspects of the system have been unitary for several years. I t also 
stated that this affirmative duty extends even to segregation not caused 
by the initial constitutional violation but occurring before a finding of 
unitariness.239 
Like Morgan v. Nucci, Pitts involved a school system that had 
integrated some, but not all, aspects of its operations.240 Because the 
district court had found the areas of student assignments, transporta-
tion, and extracurricular activities in the formerly dual DeKalb County 
School System (DCSS) to be unitary, it refused to impose additional 
duties in those areas. 241 This was despite student assignments in the 
DCSS having become increasingly segregated in previous years. 242 The 
232Id. 
233 427 U.S. 424 (1976); see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. 
234 See id. at 318-19. 
235Id. at 319 (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437 (1976)). 
236Id. at 318-19. 
237Id. at 319-26. 
238 887 F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989), rel/d, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
239Id. at 1446--48. 
240 See id. at 1443-44. 
241 See id. at 1444. 
242 See id. at 1448. 
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district court found that demographic shifts, rather than prior inten-
tionally discriminatory acts, had caused the resegregation.243 The dis-
trict court remained active in other areas, however, ordering further 
relief in the system's faculty, staff, facilities, and distribution of educa-
tional resources.244 
The court of appeals rejected this piecemeal approach.245 It di-
rected the district court to require the DCSS to continue desegregating 
student assignments to counter any demographic shifts until all aspects 
of the school system had been unitary for several years.246 This instruc-
tion was motivated by the desire to prevent resegregation and the 
conclusion that the affirmative duty to desegregate imposed by Green 
continues until the entire school system has become free of all vestiges 
of de jure segregation.247 The appellate panel described the Green 
factors as providing a benchmark for determining a school system's 
unitary status, rather than as discrete parts of a school system capable 
of becoming unitary one by one.248 
The court of appeals asserted that this holding would neither 
require district courts to impose remedies exceeding their authority 
over the school system nor contradict Pasadena City. 249 The remedy 
thus imposed would not exceed the supervising court's authority to rid 
the school system of all vestiges of de jure segregation.250 Continuing 
de jure segregation in any aspect of the system continues the constitu-
tional violation, and the supervising court's authority, throughout the 
entire system.251 The Eleventh Circuit construed Pasadena City more 
narrowly than the First Circuit had in Morgan v. Nucci.252 The Pitts 
court interpreted Pasadena City only to reject the rigid and permanent 
requirement of a substantive racial balance.253 Because of this interpre-
tation, the Pitts court required the district court to continue to enforce 
the DCSS's affirmative duty to desegregate until all vestiges of prior de 
jure segregation had been eliminated for several years.254 
243 See id. 
244 See id. at 1443-44. 
245Id. at 1445. 
246 Id. at 1447-48. 
247Id. at 1446-47. 
248 Id. at 1446. 
249 Id. at 1446-47. 
200 Id. at 1446. 
251Id. 
252 Compare id. at 1447 (Pasadena City rejects only rigid racial quota) (citing Pasadena City 
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 432 (1976» with Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318-19 
& n.5 (1st Cir. 1987) (Pasadena City requires incremental cessation of desegregation efforts) 
(citing Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 435-37). 
253 See Pitts, 887 F.2d at 1447. 
254 Id. at 1446. 
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B. Termination in the Supreme Court 
The cases from Brown I to Pasadena City illustrate the beginning 
and the middle of the Supreme Court's school desegregation doctrine. 
The appellate decisions discussed above framed the issues in the next 
phase of the Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence. The Court 
denied certiorari in Riddick,255 but agreed to reexamine DoweZp56 and 
Freeman.257 Dowell provided the Court with an opportunity to begin 
writing the end of that doctrine by deciding when judicial control of 
school districts must cease.258 Freeman further refined this, specifYing 
the manner and degree in which the bounds of a supervising court's 
powers dictate that this cessation of control must occur.259 
1. Board oj Education v. Dowell 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Board oj Education v. 
DowelP60 to resolve the split between the Tenth Circuit's judgment in 
Dowell v. School Board261 and the contrary holdings in Spangler v. 
Pasadena City Board oj Education262 and Riddick v. School Board.263 In an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court resolved this conflict by 
holding that a school district must be released from judicial control 
after it has complied in good faith with desegregation orders for a 
reasonable time and has eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segre-
gation to the extent practicable.264 
The Dowell plaintiffs' failure to contest the 1987 order in which 
the district court had dissolved its original desegregation injunction 
prompted the Court to address whether that order barred them from 
challenging later actions by the school board.265 The Court held that 
plaintiffs were not so barred because the order's use of the term 
"unitary," which the Court considered inherently vague, made the 
order so ambiguous that plaintiffs could not have known its effect.266 
The Court also expressed disapproval of the use of "unitariness" as an 
explicit constitutional requirement and indicated a preference for 
255 479 U.S. 938 (1986). The decision in Morgan was not appealed. 
256 494 U.S. 1055 (1990). 
257 498 U.S. 1081 (1991). 
258 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). 
259 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444-45 (1992). 
260 494 U.S. 1055 (1990). 
261 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
262 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). 
263 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
264 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). 
265 [d. at 244-45. 
266 [d. at 245. 
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evaluating school systems directly under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 267 
Mter disposing of this matter, the Court turned its attention to 
the question of when desegregation efforts should terminate. The 
Court first rejected the Tenth Circuit's reliance on United States v. Swift 
& Co. for the proposition that only a showing of an extreme change 
in circumstances and oppressive hardship could justify the dissolution 
of an injunction.268 It distinguished Swift because that case concerned 
a perpetual injunction.269 The Court determined that federal court 
desegregation decrees are of a character inconsistent with this ap-
proach.270 The use of the word "transition" in Brown II and Green 
indicated to the Court that federal supervision of segregated schools 
was intended to be temporary.271 This reasoning, combined with the 
importance of local control of schools272 and the limits of the federal 
equity power,273 led the Court to the conclusion that a federal court's 
regulation of a school system may not extend beyond the time required 
to remedy the past de jure segregation, and thus that Swift is inapposite 
to those decrees.274 
The Court relied instead on the formulation of the standard for 
dissolving a desegregation decree found in United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp.275 Under that standard, a decree may be dissolved if 
its purposes have been fully achieved.276 The Court held that this 
standard would be met in the context of school desegregation if the 
district court found that the school district was being operated in 
compliance with the Constitution and that a return to unconstitutional 
actions was not likely.277 The district court was to gauge the likelihood 
of such a return by examining the demonstrated good faith of the 
school board and the board's compliance with prior court orders. 278 
267 See id. at 245-46. 
268 See id. at 246-48. 
269 Id. at 246 (citing Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). 
270 !d. at 247. 
271Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (Brown 11) and Green 
v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968)). 
272 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248. The Court noted that such control of schools "allows citizens to 
participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs." 
Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (Milliken 1)). 
273 These limitations are exceeded when a court aims its decree at "a condition that does not 
violate the Constitution or ... flow from such a violation .... " Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 (quoting 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (Milliken ll)). 
274 See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249. 
275 See id. at 247 (citing United Shoe, 391 U.S. 244 (1968)). 
276 See id. (citing United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248). 
277Id. at 247. 
278 See id. at 249-50. 
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Furthermore, the Court instructed the district court to evaluate 
all aspects of the school system-student assignments, faculty, staff, 
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 279 The district 
court was ordered to use the results of this inquiry to determine 
whether the vestiges of prior intentional segregation had been elimi-
nated to the extent practicable.280 If all of these requirements were met, 
the 1985 declaration of unitariness should be affirmed and the chal-
lenge to the SRP evaluated under traditional equal protection princi-
ples. 281 However, if the district court found that the resegregation was 
caused by prior de jure acts, rather than by "private decision making 
and economics," or if the constitutional compliance or good faith of 
the school board was not clear, then the finding of unitariness should 
be reversed.282 
Justice Marshall dissented,283 arguing that local control over 
schools and the desire to limit remedies should not be placed in a 
higher position than the constitutional rights of black schoolchil-
dren.284 Marshall stressed the importance of eliminating the stigmatic 
injury of de jure segregation, and of eliminating all vestiges of prior 
discrimination that caused such an injury.285 One such vestige that 
Marshall thought to be particularly harmful was that of reemerging 
one-race schools. He felt that such schools could be traced to prior de 
jure segregation by school authorities and other state actors who had 
enforced or influenced residential segregation.286 Since the SRP prom-
ised to reestablish such schools, Marshall concluded that the purposes 
of federal intervention had not been accomplished.287 
2. Freeman v. Pitts 
Freeman v. Pitts288 gave the Court an opportunity to further refine 
the doctrine it had begun to develop in Dowell. Freeman held that it is 
within a district court's discretion to cease supervision of part of a 
279 [d. at 250 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)). 
280 [d. 
281 [d. at 249-50 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). This presumably indicated that the burden 
of proof should be returned to the plaintiffs and the presumptions against the school board 
discarded upon a finding of unitariness. See supra notes 143-60 and accompanying text. 
282Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50 & n.2. 
283 Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent. Justice Souter did not 
take part in the consideration or decision of the case. [d. at 251,268. 
284 [d. at 266-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
285 [d. at 260 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
286 See id. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
287 See id. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
288 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
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school system before the entire system has achieved unitariness.289 The 
Supreme Court began with a closer examination of the facts of the 
case. The litigation in Freeman began in 1968, when plaintiffs brought 
suit against the DeKalb County School System in the District Court for 
the Northern District of Georgia.290 DCSS immediately ceased its policy 
of "recalcitrance and hesitation" in integrating its formerly de jure 
segregated system291 and promulgated a desegregation plan in conjunc-
tion with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 292 In 
1969, DCSS adopted that plan, subject to minor revision,293 as a result 
of an order by the district court.294 
In 1986, DCSS moved for final dismissal of the litigation. The 
district court found DCSS to be unitary in the areas of student assign-
ments, transportation, extracurricular activities, and physical facili-
ties.295 The court found that DCSS was not unitary, however, with 
respect to faculty and staff assignments, resource allocation, or quality 
of education.296 The court held that while it would order DCSS to 
remedy the defects in its system, it would cease to actively supervise 
the areas of the system that were unitary. 297 
Justice Kennedy wrote the Supreme Court's opinion reversing the 
appellate court's rejection of this incremental relinquishment of judi-
cial control. 298 The Court first revisited the evaluation of the unitariness 
concept engaged in by the Dowell Court. 299 That term was noted to have 
been helpful in the remedial process, but to lack any precise content.300 
The Court stated that the term does not confine the discretion of 
289 See id. at 1444-46. 
290 Id. at 1436. 
291 Prior to the suit, DCSS had implemented only the type of freedom of choice transfer plan 
that the Court had held insufficient to satisfy a school district's remedial responsibilities in Green 
v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968). Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. This type of delay 
was typical of school boards during this period. See Days, supra note 10, at 1746-47; Swann, 402 
U.S. at 14; Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1964); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski 
County Special Sch. Dist. No. I, 778 F.2d 404, 417 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 
(1986); Liddell V. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984). 
292 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436. 
293 Mter revision, this plan abolished the freedom of choice plan, closed all de jure black 
schools, and instituted a neighborhood schools plan. Id. 
294 Id. 
295Id. at 1437. 
296 Although the district court found black students' achievement to be satisfactory, this area 
was found not to be unitary because of the higher level of education of teachers in majority white 
schools, and the disparity in resource allocation and quality of education between majority white 
and majority black schools. See id. at 1441-42. 
297 See id. at 1442. 
298Id. at 1444-45. 
299 Id. at 1443. 
300 Id. at 1443-44. 
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district courts as defined by traditional equitable principles, but that 
those courts should continue to balance public and private interests to 
redress the constitutional injury.30l 
The Court then drew on Pasadena City Board of Education v. 
Spanglef>02 to illustrate that such balancing requires that district courts 
be given the discretion to withdraw their control over school systems 
incrementally.303 The Court noted that the Pasadena City decision had 
rejected a district court's continued readjustment of student assign-
ments in a school system in which that aspect had been balanced, as 
that readjustment exceeded the authority of the district court.304 The 
Court concluded that the rationale of that case dictated that a district 
court has the discretion to partially withdraw from supervision of a 
school system, while retaining jurisdiction over that system until the 
remedial goal has been fully realized. 305 Justice Kennedy described such 
relinquishment as an appropriate means to the ultimate end of return-
ing the school system to local controP06 He concluded that the impor-
tance of such control, the temporary nature of the desegregation 
remedy, and the limits on the power of federal courts mandated this 
holding.307 
The Court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the 
affirmative duty to eliminate vestiges of discrimination extended to the 
use of "bizarre" methods to rectifY resegregation caused by factors not 
traceable to intentionally discriminatory actions by the school board.30B 
Questioning both the authority and the ability of federal courts to 
effectively counter massive demographic shifts, the Court held that the 
affirmative duty to desegregate an aspect of a school system's opera-
tions ceases once school authorities carry their burden of demonstrat-
ing that the racial imbalance caused by de jure segregation in that 
aspect has been remedied.3og The Court acknowledged the duty to 
eliminate all vestiges of prior de jure segregation and recognized the 
possibility that such vestiges may be subtle.310 It stated, however, that 
they "must be so real that they have a causal link to the [original] de 
301 Id. at 1444. 
302 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
303 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1444. 
304 Id. (quoting Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 436). 
305 Id. at 1444-45. 
306 Id. at 1445. 
307 Id. at 1446. 
30BId. at 1447-49. 
309 Id. at 1447-48. The Court noted that the length of time for which the remedy had been 
in force and the demonstrated good faith of the school board could be used to demonstrate that 
current conditions were not the result of past discrimination. Id. at 1448. 
310 Id. 
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jure violation."311 The Court remanded the case to the district court 
with instructions to evaluate whether the school board had complied 
with court orders in areas where supervision was to be withdrawn, 
whether retention of control over those areas was necessary or practi-
cable for compliance in other areas of the school system, and whether 
the school authorities had acted in good faith.312 
Justice Scalia concurred, pointing to the impossibility of determin-
ing whether remaining segregation results from public or private de-
cisions.313 He noted that the pro-plaintiff presumptions created by the 
Court had preordained a finding of de jure segregation in almost all 
cases, as school boards were unable to rebut those presumptions.314 
Justice Scalia stated that while those presumptions may have been 
appropriate at the inception of the Court's school desegregation juris-
prudence, the factual basis for them had disappeared over the years 
as private factors increasingly took precedence.315 He concluded that 
the Court would soon have to abandon these presumptions in favor of 
traditional equal protection principles and burdens of proof.316 
Justice Souter concurred only to explain the inquiry that he be-
lieved a district court should engage in before relinquishing control 
over a school system.317 Souter warned against such action where the 
demographic changes leading to a finding of unitariness are them-
selves a product of past de jure segregation and the "patterns of 
thinking" that de jure segregation creates.318 He also cautioned against 
a cessation of supervision where future imbalances in the remedied 
aspect of the school system could be caused by continuing de jure 
segregation in other aspects.319 
Justice Blackmun's opinion, in which Justices Stevens and O'Connor 
joined, opened with the observation that in the decades since Broum 
1, DCSS students had never attended a desegregated school system.320 
In agreeing with the Court's general holdings,321 he echoed Justice 
311 Id. 
312Id. 
313Id. at 1451 (Scalia,].. concurring). 
314 Id. at 1452-53 (Scalia,]., concurring) ("Conversely, if we alter our normal approach and 
require the school authorities to establish the negative ... the plaintiffs will almost always win."). 
315Id. at 1453 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
316Id. at 1453-54 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
317 See id. at 1454 (Souter,]., concurring). 
318 See id. (Souter,]., concurring). 
319 See id. at 1454-55 (Souter,]., concurring). 
320 Id. (Blackmun,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
321 Id. at 1455 (Blackmun,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Souter's recommendations to district courts considering whether to 
relinquish control over a school system.322 He stated that such courts 
should consider any contribution that school authorities' actions have 
made to demographic shifts and whether retention of control over the 
area to be relinquished would help bring another part of the system 
into compliance.323 Blackmun also suggested that district courts view 
school boards asserting their good faith and intentions with "reason-
able skepticism" to ensure the conversion to a unitary system.324 
V. REEXAMINING THE TERMINATION OF DESEGREGATION 
Dowell and Freeman, taken together, greatly diminish the affirma-
tive duty to desegregate imposed on school boards by Green v. County 
School Board.325 Rather than desegregating a school system until all 
vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated, school boards 
may simply demonstrate their present compliance with remedial de-
crees and good faith commitment to the Constitution.326 Vestiges of 
prior segregation must be removed, but only if they are directly trace-
able to unconstitutional acts by the school board, and not to "private 
decisionmaking and economics. "327 School boards also no longer bear 
the burden of desegregating their entire school system as commanded 
by the Court in Green.328 Instead, school authorities may remedy dis-
crete aspects of their system one at a time, even if the entire school 
system has never achieved unitariness.329 This will result in an inquiry 
that strongly resembles the concept of incremental segregative effect 
introduced by the court in Dayton 1,330 and subsequently rejected in 
Dayton 11331 Courts must discover the exten t of segregation caused by 
school boards, determine how much segregation resulted from inter-
vening private decision making, and then remedy only the former. 332 
322Id. at 1455-57 (Blackmun, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
323Id. (Blackmun,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
324Id. (Blackmun, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
325 See Green, 391 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1968); supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text. 
326Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991). 
327 See Duwell, 498 U.S. at 249-50; Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1447. 
328 Green, 391 U.S. at 436-37. 
329Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1455 (1992) (Blackmun, j., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see id. at 1444-45 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
330 See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton I); see supra notes 
151-55 and accompanying text. 
331 See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,537 (1979) (Dayton II). 
332 Cf Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420. 
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A. The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate Survived Pasadena City Board 
of Education v. Spangler333 
The Court has employed two tactics to lessen school boards' affir-
mative duty to desegregate. First, in Dowell, the Court explicitly shifted 
the focus of the inquiry away from unitariness as a goal of the remedial 
effort.334 In Freeman the Court further noted that the concept of uni-
tariness does not confine the discretion of the supervising court in 
devising equitable remedies.335 The Court preferred instead to measure 
school boards' actions against the requirements of the Constitution as 
interpreted in Freeman and Dowell.336 Second, in Freeman the Court 
essentially held that Pasadena Cit'/37 modified the duties underlying 
the concept of unitariness, and abolished the affirmative duty to de-
segregate to the extent that that duty requires vestiges of racial dis-
crimination to be eliminated and racial identifiability of schools to be 
remedied until the school system is entirely unitary.338 
By its disparagement of the concept of unitariness, the Court may 
have disposed of that concept as a measure of school authorities' 
compliance with their affirmative duty to desegregate. This does not, 
however, affect the duty that unitariness had previously measured. 
Under the Court's precedents, all vestiges of segregation must be 
completely removed from a school system before remedial efforts may 
cease.33g While the Court may choose not to use unitariness as a meas-
ure of the completion of that duty, it must supply an independent 
justification if it is to make that duty lighter. 
The Court unsuccessfully searched for such a justification for 
reducing the affirmative duty to desegregate by following the expansive 
reading of Pasadena City engaged in by the First Circuit in Morgan v. 
Nucci. 340 Pasadena City does not serve this purpose. Simply put, that 
case does not require a supervising district court to incrementally 
relinquish control over a school district, nor does it reduce the affir-
mative duty to desegregate. As the Court in Pasadena City realized, the 
333427 U.S. 424, 427 (1976). 
334 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. 
Ct. 1430, 1443-44 (1992). 
335 112 S. Ct. at 1444. 
336 See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443-44; Dowel~ 498 U.S. at 245-46. 
337 427 U.S. 424 (1979). 
338 112 S. Ct. at 1444-45; see supra notes 299-311 and accompanying text. 
339 See supra notes 161~8 and accompanying text. 
340 Margan had construed Pasadena City to require courts to withdraw supervision over 
school districts incrementally as each part of the district became unitary. 831 F.2d 313, 319 (1st 
Cir. 1987); see supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. 
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holding of that case was limited to a rejection of the district court's 
order that student assignments be perpetually readjusted to reflect a 
certain racial balance.341 Pasadena City therefore does not in any way 
lessen the affirmative duty to desegregate school systems that have not 
yet achieved unitariness.342 
The limits on the power of the federal courts and the concerns 
for local control that motivated the Pasadena City decision-and that 
the Court relied on in Dowell and Freeman-neither require a district 
court to relinquish control over aspects of a school system as they 
become unitary nor mandate that full efforts to desegregate not be 
undertaken.343 Because Brown I and the cases that followed declared 
the unconstitutionality of segregated school systems,344 a court does not 
exceed its constitutional authority so long as any part of the school 
system retains vestiges of state-imposed segregation.345 The Court itself 
implicitly admits this in Freeman v. Pitts by allowing the supervising 
court the discretion to relinquish control over part of a school district. 
If the limitations on the power of the federal courts and the concerns 
for local control that motivated the decision in Pasadena City required 
a supervising district court to give up control over facets of a school 
system as they become unitary, the supervising court would not have 
the discretion to relinquish control that the Court finds. Instead, the 
supervising court would be required to surrender control over each 
aspect of the school system as soon as it became unitary to avoid 
exceeding its constitutional authority. 
The fact that local control of a school district will be displaced by 
the orders of a supervising court is not a reason to forego a compre-
hensive and effective remedy. In Brown II, the Court recognized the 
interference with local control that the remedial process would cause, 
341 See Pasadena City, 427 U.S. at 432 ("All that is now before us are the questions of whether 
the District Court was correct in denying relief when petitioners in 1974 sought to modify the 
'no majority' requirement .... "); see alsoVettereli v. United States Dist. Ct., 435 U.S. 1304, 1308 
(1978) (Rehnquist, CircuitJudge) (Spanglerwould be violated only if court forced school authori-
ties to reassign students annually). 
342 See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988-89 (lOth Cir. 1985); Tracy Ellen Sivitz, 
Note, Eliminating the Continuing Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education as a Remedy for 
Unlawful School Desegregation, 97 YALE LJ. 1173, 1191 (1988) (Morgan incorrectly cited Pasadena 
City to approve incremental cessation of supervision). 
343 In fact, those concerns were expressly contemplated by the Court in Brown II as factors 
to be considered in shaping a remedy, not as a limitation on the power of the district court to 
redress the constitutional injury. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (l955) (Brown 
II). 
344 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
345 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (discrimination in schools is condi-
tion that offends the Constitution and provides basis for intervention). 
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and ordered district courts to consider this when effectuating an equi-
table remedy.346 To contend that a court exceeds its authority by con-
tinuing to fully eradicate vestiges of segregation assumes that those 
actions are outside the court's discretion. If the remedy for de jure 
segregation is full compliance with the affirmative duty to desegregate, 
the district court remains within its authority for as long as vestiges of 
prior discrimination remain in the school system. 
B. Reemphasizing Stigmatic Injury 
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Dowell, the Court has 
regressed from its original remedial approach to a forward-looking 
doctrine in determining when school desegregation efforts should 
cease.347 The Court's present emphasis is not focused on whether the 
effects of past de jure segregation have been remedied, but on whether 
the school board has recently complied with the Constitution. Al-
though this approach may reflect an understandable sympathy for 
school boards that have inherited segregated systems from past admini-
strations, it misses the point of the Court's school desegregation juris-
prudence by failing to address the stigmatic injury done to black 
children by discrimination in public education.348 
The stigmatic injury of de jure segregation was the basis for fed-
eral court intervention relied on by Brown 1, as the Court confirmed 
that such discrimination sends a message of inferiority to the children 
of the disfavored race.349 Because the stigmatic injury persists in a 
school system for as long as vestiges of prior de jure segregation 
remain,350 the remedial process must meet the affirmative duty im-
posed by Green-discrimination must be removed "root and branch" 
from all aspects of the school system's operations.351 
Instead of easing the burdens placed on school boards by their 
predecessors' unconstitutional conduct, the Court should have seized 
the opportunity presented by Board of Education v. Dowell and Freeman 
v. Pitts to order school boards to remedy this stigmatic injury. In 
deciding these cases, the Court should have reinforced the affirmative 
duty to desegregate introduced by Green and refocused school deseg-
346 Brown IL 349 U.S. at 298-300. 
347 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 261 (1991) (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
348 Id.; see supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text. 
349 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.ll (1954) (Brown l); supra notes 20-42 
and accompanying text. 
350 See supra note 142. 
35] See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
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regation remedies on the stigmatic injury caused by de jure segrega-
tion. 
The Court in Dowell was correct in holding that judicially enforced 
school desegregation should be halted when remedial goals are 
achieved to the extent practicable.352 The Court's analysis of when this 
has occurred is flawed, however, because of its failure to address the 
stigmatic injury that vestiges of prior discrimination inflict on minority 
children. Where school authorities' acts cause this stigmatic injury, the 
remedial effort must continue. 
The Court's major failing in this regard is that it implies a distinc-
tion between resegregation caused by the original de jure acts and 
resegregation that is caused by "private decisionmaking. "353 This is 
troubling because private decision making, for which the Court con-
cludes school authorities are not responsible, is invariably influenced 
by continuing vestiges of de jure segregation that continue until the 
school district is made unitary.354 Vestiges of segregated schools will 
influence private housing decisions, causing residential choices to fol-
low the patterns set by vestiges remaining in the schools. This will cause 
racially identifiable schools to reemerge and inflict the stigmatic harms 
prohibited by Brown L Given the difficulty of determining what has 
caused present imbalances,355 and the inevitable interrelationship be-
tween racially identifiable schools and residential segregation, racial 
imbalances in a school district should be assumed to stem from de jure 
segregation. The Court should therefore require that the affirmative 
duty to desegregate be enforced until the schools have ceased to be 
racially identifiable for a period of several years.356 
Emphasizing stigmatic injury also reveals that it is mistaken to 
allow court supervision over any facet of a school system's operations 
to cease before the entire system has achieved unitariness. The Court 
352 See Board of Educ. v. Do~ell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) 
353 See id. at 250 n.2. 
354While this is especially likely in the time before any part of the school system has been 
made unitary, it can also follow a declaration of unitariness as to one facet of the school system's 
operations. In Freeman, for example, the schools remained racially identifiable in their faculty 
assignments and quality of education. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1437 (1992). It is almost inconceivable 
that this would not influence "private decisionmaking" in the area. See supra notes 167-68 and 
accompanying text Student assignments, which had been made unitary for the moment, would 
then reemerge as a dual element of school operations indirectly caused by the continuing vestiges 
of discrimination. 
355 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
356 Cf Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) 
(school system unitary when vestiges of discrimination have been removed from all aspects of 
school system for several years). 
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has recognized that the aspects of school systems examined in Greenr-
student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular ac-
tivities, and facilities357-merely provide indicia for determining when 
the duty to desegregate the entire school system has been met.358 This 
reflects the inherent interrelatedness of these different aspects, and 
reveals the difficulty of remedying facets of a school system one at a 
time. 359 The Court should require district courts to continue to remedy 
all aspects of school systems until unitariness is achieved in order to 
prevent any aspect from causing the stigmatic injury of segregation. 
Incremental relinquishment of control over school boards, therefore, 
should not be permitted. 
The Court also erred by creating a scheme that weighs the good 
faith of the school board in determining whether vestiges of prior 
segregation remain.360 The Court properly recognized that a school 
board's good faith is probative of the likelihood that it will not discrimi-
nate in the future. 361 It mistakenly asserted, however, that this good 
faith also reveals the likelihood that current imbalances are vestiges of 
prior discriminatory acts. This definition of vestiges of prior discrimi-
nation is incompatible with the concept of stigmatic injury. Ifvestiges 
that continue to inflict the harms of segregation remain, it is immate-
rial that school authorities may have acted in good faith. To ensure 
that conditions that cause stigmatic harms do not continue, vestiges of 
de jure segregation should be defined as any present conditions that 
cause those harms, without regard to the good faith of school authori-
ties. The Court should require school boards to remove all such ves-
tiges before judicial control is lifted to ensure that stigmatic harms do 
not continue. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court identified the 
stigmatic injury to black school children that public school segregation 
causes, and concluded that such segregation amounts to a denial of 
equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Subsequent holdings of the Court enforced this decision 
by requiring the removal of all vestiges of segregation that continue to 
inflict stigmatic injury. The doctrine developed in Freeman v. Pitts and 
357 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). 
358 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
359 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
360 See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992). 
361 See id. at 1449. 
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Board of Education v. Dowell dilutes this duty, concentrating instead on 
considerations of whether a school board has complied in good faith 
with court orders, and whether the school board seems likely to oper-
ate its school system in a nondiscriminatory manner in the future. 
Unless the Court returns to its earlier stance, and focuses on removing 
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation, the stigmatic injury to minor-
ity children inflicted by past segregation is indeed "unlikely ever to be 
undone. "362 
362 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954) (Brown 1). 

